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Sense of agency (SoAg) refers to the feel-
ing of control over one’s actions and forms
an integral part of our cognitive and
social lives (Moore and Fletcher, 2012).
For example, it is thought that the recog-
nition of oneself as the agent of an action
plays a fundamental role in self-awareness
(Jeannerod, 2003). It is also thought that
the experience of agency is important for
guiding our attributions of responsibility
(Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009).
The importance of SoAg is also demon-
strated by the striking changes in this
experience associated with various psy-
chiatric (e.g., schizophrenia) and neuro-
logical (e.g., cortico-basal degeneration)
disorders. While in recent years a num-
ber of studies have examined SoAg in
these clinical groups, one group of indi-
viduals that have not yet been examined
are those with mirror-touch synaesthe-
sia (MTS). This opinion article seeks to
explain why changes in SoAg may occur
inMTS and also whymirror-touch synaes-
thetes could offer unique insights into the
neurocognitive basis of SoAg.
For most of us, observing another per-
son being touched activates neural regions
in the somatosensory cortex that are
also involved in experiencing touch (e.g.,
Keysers et al., 2004, 2010; Ebisch et al.,
2008; Schaefer et al., 2012), however this
activation does not lead to overt sensa-
tions of the observed event: we typically do
not feel any tactile sensation when observ-
ing the tactile experience of others. On the
contrary, people with MTS, approximately
1.6% of the population (Banissy et al.,
2009), do experience overt tactile sensa-
tions to the observed event: they feel tactile
sensations on their body when simply see-
ing touch to another’s body (Blakemore
et al., 2005; Holle et al., 2011; Banissy,
2013). These experiences are reported to
be automatic (Banissy and Ward, 2007),
enduring (Holle et al., 2011), and may
be associated with broader differences in
social perception (Banissy andWard, 2007;
Banissy et al., 2011; Goller et al., 2013).
Recent studies (e.g., Aimola-Davies and
White, 2013; Holle et al., 2013; Maister
et al., 2013) suggest that individuals with
MTS have atypical self-other representa-
tions. For example, Maister et al. (2013)
ran a study using the “enfacement illu-
sion” paradigm. In the typical “enfacement
illusion,” participants are asked to say to
what extent images of faces that were mor-
phed between themselves or another per-
son look like themselves or the other; they
then watch a video in which the other
person is touched in synchrony and con-
gruent with a felt touch on the partici-
pant’s face. After experiencing a synchrony
between the observed and felt touch, the
images that participants had initially per-
ceived as containing equal quantities of self
and other became more likely to be recog-
nized as the self (Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012). Maister et al. (2013)
adapted this paradigm in MTS, by remov-
ing the physical touch component. That
is to say that individuals observed touch
to other people, but veridical synchronous
touch was not physically applied to the
face. They showed that MT synaesthetes
experienced the same effect of “enface-
ment illusion” in the absence of a touch
applied to their face, concluding that sim-
ply viewing the touch on others evokes
changes in self-other representations in
MTS. In this regard, MTS may therefore
be characterized as bringing more mal-
leable body representations, reflecting a
blurring in the self-other distinction pro-
cesses (Banissy and Ward, 2013; Maister
et al., 2013).
This self-other blurring may be sig-
nificant for SoAg. Experimental work in
neurotypical individuals has shown how
the deliberate blurring of the boundaries
between self and other can have dramatic
effects on SoAg. A good example of this is
the so-called “Vicarious Agency” illusion,
first demonstrated byWegner et al. (2004).
In this paradigm, participants sit in front
of a mirror with their arms placed out of
view, under a sheet that covers everything
below their shoulders. A cardboard shield
is placed behind their back to block their
view of the experimenter standing behind
them. The experimenter places their arm
forward so that it appears where the par-
ticipant’s own arm would have been. This
set-up is therefore aimed at engendering
self-other confusion. Participants are then
asked to look at the mirror in front of
them, while the experimenter performs
the gestures. Participants also wear head-
phones on which are played action pre-
views (e.g., “wave your hand,” “make the
ok gesture”). These previews are either
congruent or incongruent with the actions
subsequently made by the experimenter.
Wegner et al. found that participants expe-
rienced a SoAg and ownership over the
arm that appeared in the mirror and that
their experience of controlling the move-
ments was increased when the previews
were congruent with the action the exper-
imenter made. In this way, we can see how
an experimentally-induced blurring of the
boundaries between self and other has a
striking effect on SoAg. A strong predic-
tion from this finding is that individuals
with MTS will be more vulnerable to these
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agency illusions. This is something we are
currently testing.
Another line of enquiry worth pur-
suing is whether or not these putative
agency effects in MTS are mediated by
the changes in the sense of body owner-
ship associated with the condition (e.g.,
Aimola-Davies and White, 2013; Maister
et al., 2013). The sense of body owner-
ship refers to the feeling that the body
one inhabits is one’s own. Importantly, the
sense of body ownership and SoAg are
not independent. For example, it is often
assumed that SoAg is predicated on recog-
nizing that the moving body part is one’s
own. The existing work on MTS would
suggest that changes in sense of owner-
ship represent a primary disturbance in
the condition. One prediction, therefore,
is that the putative changes in SoAg are a
consequence of these fundamental distur-
bances in sense of ownership. Intriguingly,
the relationship between agency and own-
ership can also work in the opposite
direction. Previous research in neurotyp-
ical adults has shown that SoAg can
play a role in structuring bodily aware-
ness (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2010). In the
context of MTS, one prediction from
this would be that if there were agency-
processing deficits these would exacer-
bate more basic disturbances in bodily
awareness. We are clearly suggesting here
that MTS is primarily a “disorder” of
ownership, which can have consequences
for SoAg and which in turn can further
worsen ownership disturbances. However,
at present this is speculative and is some-
thing that should be systematically exam-
ined in future research.
A further benefit of examining of SoAg
in MTS is that it may help constrain
our understanding of how inter-individual
differences in self-other representations
involved in SoAg and sense of body owner-
ship interact to structure bodily awareness.
Indeed, it has been shown that patients
with impairments in self-other discrimi-
nation perform poorly on agency tasks:
in particular, Daprati et al. (1997) showed
that people with schizophrenia had diffi-
culties when required to correctly iden-
tify the origin of an action. Even in the
absence of clinical implications, it is likely
that individuals with MTS can experience
a distortion in their SoAg and could be
a non-clinical framework for studying the
determinants of agency and its disrup-
tions. It is in this context that MTS may
also help inform models of SoAg, increas-
ing our understanding of the interaction
between ownership and agency. It is our
contention that MTS offers a rare oppor-
tunity to investigate this interaction more
directly.
In the context of existing models of
SoAg there are also some specific predic-
tions about agency processing in MTS
that could be tested. For example, the so-
called comparator model of SoAg (e.g.,
Blakemore et al., 2002) states that pre-
dicted sensory feedback is subtracted
out of the actual sensory percept dur-
ing movement. According to the model
this sensory attenuation is a key mecha-
nism that allows us to distinguish between
self- and externally-generated effects.
Previous work in neurotypical individ-
uals has shown that sensory suppression is
only found for self-generated movements
and not when observing someone else
move (Weiss and Schütz-Bosbach, 2012).
However, given the disturbances in self-
other discrimination in MTS one might
predict that individuals with MTS would
also show sensory suppression effects
when observing someone else move.
The final benefit of research on MTS
that we wish to highlight concerns the
brain basis of SoAg. Although a great deal
of work has been done on the neural corre-
lates of SoAg, we still know relatively little
about the neural networks andmechanisms
underpinning it (see David, 2012, for a
review). We would suggest that research
on MTS could help in this regard by fur-
nishing our understanding of the brain
basis of SoAg. Two regions commonly
implicated in SoAg are the anterior insula
and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The
anterior insula is heavily linked with self-
other discrimination (Ruby and Decety,
2001) and is also activated in agency
attribution tasks (e.g., Farrer and Frith,
2002). Concerning the TPJ, many stud-
ies on SoAg that rely on the comparison
between self-generated and the externally
produced sensory signals have found acti-
vation in the right TPJ (Ruby and Decety,
2001; Farrer et al., 2003; see Decety and
Lamm, 2007 for a meta-analysis of fMRI
studies on TPJ). Interestingly, the ante-
rior insula and TPJ also appear to play a
key role in MTS. A common suggestion
is that MTS reflects a hyper-activation of
the mirror-touch network; that is, brain
regions involved in experiencing and pas-
sively observing touch to others, including
the primary and secondary somatosen-
sory cortices (SI, SII) (Blakemore et al.,
2005; Holle et al., 2013). Banissy andWard
(2013), suggest that this hyper-activation
of the mirror-touch system in individ-
uals with MTS may be gated by atypi-
cal functioning in neural regions involved
in self-other representations, and high-
light potential roles for both the anterior
insula and the TPJ in this process. One
potential avenue for future research would
be to examine whether this putative gat-
ing mechanism is functionally relevant for
SoAg, perhaps having a role in modulating
more basic sensorimotor processes known
to be important for this experience.
In summary, MTS refers to a rare expe-
rience in which observing touch or pain to
another person evokes a tactile experience
on the observer’s body. There is growing
evidence to suggest that this is linked to
a blurring of self-other representation. In
this article we have discussed how this dis-
turbance may produce changes in SoAg in
MTS. We have also discussed the ways in
which research on MTS can improve our
understanding of the neurocognitive basis
of SoAg. In light of these discussions we
believe that future research on SoAg in
MTS is likely to provide valuable insights,
both for those with a primary interest in
MTS and for those with a primary interest
in SoAg.
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